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At the Crossroads 
Chamsy el-Ojeili
[Caesarism] always expresses the solution as the “arbitration”, en-
trusted to a great personality, of a politico-historical situation char-
acterised by a potentially catastrophic equilibrium of forces.1
THERE ARE A lot of interesting things to say about the Trump victory—the winning over of certain sectors of the working class and factions of the middle class threatened 
by the prospect of downward mobility, the compromise with the 
Christian Right, the vast impoverishment of the Clinton cam-
paign, and more. Here, I am interested in adopting a wider optic, 
through which Trump is just one of a host of ‘morbid symptoms’ 
1 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, london 1998, p. 219.
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of a cycle Antonio Gramsci characterised as ‘organic crisis’.
First, a number of commentators would date this organ-
ic crisis to 2008. William Davies has recently suggested that the 
financial crisis has ushered in a new, third moment of neo-liber-
alism.2 This ‘punitive’ neo-liberalism encompasses an ‘ethos of 
heavily moralized … punishment’, unleashing hatred on disad-
vantaged sectors of the population, and it is ‘post-critical’, lacking 
any ‘aspiration to represent reality’, in favour of tireless reitera-
tion of empty affirmations: there is no housing crisis, homeless-
ness is a matter of shiftlessness and criminality, and so on. 
At the same time, and bound up with the previous point, 
Razmig Keucheyan and Cedric Durand3 suggest a newly domi-
nant mode of governance has arrived, which they characterise as 
‘bureaucratic caesarism’, a response to economic landslides and 
considerable volatility in public opinion,4 and founded, in this 
case, on the rule, without hegemony, of high finance and the civil 
bureaucracy. This politics is tied, by these authors, to the clear 
shift of sovereignty to a technocratic sphere, a post-ideological 
insulation and retreat from popular pressures, in the name of 
economic order. 
This, though, further opens the way for the emergence 
of a properly charismatic caesarism around a ‘great “heroic” 
personality’.5 This is the moment of Trump and Right-wing pop-
2 William Davies, ‘The New Neoliberalism’, New Left Review September-October, 
101 2016, 121-34.
3 Razmig Keucheyan and Cedric Durand, ‘Bureaucratic Caesarism: A Gramscian 
Outlook on the Crisis of Europe’, Historical Materialism 23/2 2015, 23-51.
4 As Wolfgang Streek puts this, ‘Among ordinary people, there is now a pervasive 
sense that politics can no longer make a difference in their lives, as reflected 
in common perceptions of deadlock, incompetence and corruption among what 
seems an increasingly self-contained and self-serving political class, united in 
their claim that “there is no alternative” to them and their policies’. Wolfgang 
Streek, ‘A problem with democracy’, Verso Blog, 17 November 2016, http://www.
versobooks.com/blogs/2943-wolfgang-streeck-a-problem-with-democracy.
5 Gramsci, ibid.
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ulism, more generally. These forces have appealed to certain 
traditionally leftist welfarist, protectionist, and anti-elite ideas, 
and mobilised serious challenges to the political ‘cartels’ repre-
sented by the centrist, ‘establishment’ parties of Right and left.
Unsurprisingly, many commentators have invoked the 
spectre of fascism here. Clearly, on this question, we need to steer 
a path away from both fear-filled catastrophism and complacen-
cy. In Michael Mann’s work on the genesis and central features 
of fascism, he emphasises an activating background of multi-di-
mensional crisis—war devastation, world-economic collapse from 
1929, the unstable transition towards liberal democracy amidst 
leftist mobilization, and a general sense of civilizational contra-
diction and decay.6 We can see elements of these factors in play 
within the world-system today. 
Further, Mann outlines five component parts of fascism 
—nationalism, statism, transcendence, cleansing, and paramili-
tarism. How does today’s Right-wing populism look, in these 
terms? Elements of the first four components are clearly visible: 
a commitment to an integral nation and intolerance towards cul-
tural diversity; a certain faith in state action—penal populism, 
exclusionary welfare measures, protectionism, military hawk-
ishness—as a way of solving crises and bringing prosperity and 
harmony; a desire to transcend strife and a disillusionment with 
actually existing liberal democracy; and a hope to cleanse the 
nation of political opponents or cultural outsiders. The fifth ele-
ment, paramilitarism, has not yet arrived. 
On the other hand, nationalism and statism, today, 
surely happen on the very different terrain of globalised capital-
ism, thirty years of attacks on the big state, and a comparable 
period of pro-globalization rhetoric. Similarly, everyone, includ-
ing the Right-populists, is democratic today and pays lip service 
6 Michael Mann, Fascists, Cambridge 2004.
174 Counterfutures 3
to the discourse of human rights, while sexism and racism, as 
Göran Therborn puts it, have been discredited as explicit public 
discourses in a big part of the world.7 These factors would appear 
to set profound limits to authoritarian corporatism, cleansing, 
and paramilitarism. 
The balance sheet seems to me, then, quite a mixture—
a moment of danger and opportunity for those on the left. 
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7 Göran Therborn, The World: A Beginner’s Guide, Cambridge 2011.
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